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CHAPTER V: LIABILITY OF THE PLATFORM OPERATOR
ARTICLE 16: OVERVIEW
1. A platform operator who presents itself to customers and suppliers as 
an intermediary in a prominent way is not liable for non-performance 
under supplier-customer contracts.
2. In addition to any other liability of the platform operator under platform-
supplier contracts or platform-customer contracts, a platform operator 
may be liable:
(a) to customers for failing to remove misleading information given by 
suppliers under Article 17;
(b) to customers who can reasonably rely on the predominant infl uence 
of the platform operator over suppliers under Article 18;
(c) to customers or suppliers for misleading statements made by the 
platform operator under Article 19;
(d) to customers or suppliers for guarantees given under Article 20.
1. Main content and function
Chapter V governs the liability of the platform operator towards suppliers.1 
Th e heading of the chapter is, however, not completely accurate, as it suggests 
this chapter should determine the specifi c requirements for the liability of the 
platform operator for the non-performance or improper performance or other 
types of misbehaviour by suppliers. Chapter V, however, does not deal principally 
with the question of the operator’s liability resulting from its role as intermedi-
ary, i.e. resulting directly from the contracts concluded between customers and 
1 Christoph Busch, Hans Schulte-Nölke, Aneta Wiewiórowska-Domagalska and Fryderyk 
Zoll, ‘Th e Rise of the Platform Economy: A New Challenge for the Consumer Contract Law’ (2016) 
EuCML 3, 7–9.
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the platform operator. Th e Discussion Draft  sets out rules on the duties of the 
platforms in relation to customers in Chapter III and towards the suppliers in 
Chapter IV. Among the general provisions of Chapter II, there are also rules 
that are applicable to the relationships of the platform with customers and sup-
pliers alike, though seen from the perspective of the ‘two-sided-relationship’ 
that the platform concludes with both groups of users. Chapter V, on the other 
hand, purports to deal with the triangular relationship that emerges between 
the operator, the customer and the supplier or that might emerge among them.2 
While the liability of the platform operator for the suppliers, or (in the case 
of Articles 19 and 20) also for the customers, is perceived as an exception in 
terms of the regular contract law, it is one of the characteristic features of the 
rules introduced by the Discussion Draft . Th e role of a platform oft en goes 
beyond the role of a simple intermediary. Th e platform could be the organiser 
of two markets (of the suppliers and of the customers), the main player in the 
organisation of certain business activities and oft en also the party dominating 
all legal relationships, not only between the platform operator and the users 
(the customer and supplier respectively) but also between the customers and 
suppliers.3 Th e platform may also exercise an important role in the fulfi lment 
of contractual obligations – it oft en receives payments from the customers, 
which are then distributed to the suppliers. In many situations, to reduce the 
role of the platform operator exclusively to the role of the intermediary would 
not refl ect the real position of the operator in this triangular relationship.4 
Th e platform scheme not only facilitates the process of contract-making, 
but the role of the platform operator might not diff er greatly from the role of 
a trader, who renders its business with the help and participation of suppliers. 
It is, however, also true that the role played by the suppliers diff ers from be-
ing merely an employee,5 as they usually have more autonomy in organising 
their commercial activity. Th erefore, it would oft en be incorrect to discharge
the suppliers from the contractual obligations. If certain conditions are ful-
fi lled, the suppliers and the platform should form a ‘camp’ over the contractual 
relationship, participating not only in the profi ts generated by the contract 
concluded with the customers but also sharing the contractual risks.
2 See however the criticism to the approach presented in this Chapter: Caroline Cauff mann, 
‘Th e Commission’s European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy – (Too) Platform and Service 
Provider Friendly?’ (2016) EuCML 235, 240.
3 Christoph Busch, Hans Schulte-Nölke, Aneta Wiewiórowska-Domagalska, Fryderyk Zoll, ‘Th e 
Rise of the Platform Economy: A New Challenge for the Consumer Contract Law’ (2016) EuCML 3–5.
4 Ibidem 3, 4. 
5 Albeit the role of the supplier in the particular scheme (e.g. Uber) of the relationships within 
the triangle consisting of the supplier, platform operator and the customer can be controversial. 
See: O’Connor v Uber Technologies, Inc., No C-13-3826 EMC (N D Cal. 2015). Marie Jull Sørensen, 
‘Private Law Perspectives on Platform Law Services’ (2016) EuCML 15, 16. See also sceptical analysis 
of Marie Jull Sørensen at 16–17; Cf. Art. 1 Commentary, 1.1. General scope: Triangle of contracts.
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Article 16 has a double function. Primarily it expresses the principle of non-
liability of the platform operator, which presents its role as an intermediary in 
a transparent way (section 1). Section 2 sets out exceptions to the principle of 
the non-liability of the intermediary. Th ese are the following: (1) the liability 
to customers for failing to remove misleading information provided by the 
platform provider; (2) the liability for the non-performance of the supplier if 
qualifi ed requirements are fulfi lled; (3) the liability of the platform for its own 
misleading statements (in relation to customers and suppliers); and fi nally (4) 
the liability for the operator’s own promises (guarantees). Article 16 section 2 
does not elaborate on these exceptions, since it is the subject matter of subse-
quent articles. Article 16 section 1 provides only an overview to facilitate the 
orientation within the system of Chapter V. 
Th is scheme requires further discussion, as the current text is somewhat 
incoherent.6 Article 16 section 1 has been draft ed as a principle, and section 2 
contains exceptions to this principle. Th e liability provided by letters (c) and 
(d) is not a liability of the operator for the non-performance of the supplier, but 
it is the own liability of the platform operator. Hence the liability under letters 
(c) and (d) cannot be perceived as an exception to the principle of the non-
liability of the operator as an intermediary for the misbehaviour of suppliers.7 
2. Sources
Th e principle of the non-liability of the platforms is a result of adopting the 
classical approach to the privity of contracts. Hence, the contract concluded 
between a customer and the platform operator produces only eff ects between 
the parties of the contract. Th ese eff ects are generally not governed by this 
chapter, despite the content of Articles 19 and 20, which might be seen as 
also governing the relationship arising directly from the contract between the 
platform operator and the supplier. 
Th e question of the liability of the platform operator for the failure of the 
supplier’s performance is already addressed in the existing acquis communautaire. 
Th e main example could be the new Package Travel Directive. Th is directive 
also deals with online-platforms, although the concept has not been used in 
the text of the directive.8 Th e directive addresses one of the main problems, 
6 Th ese ambiguities have been identifi ed by Caroline Cauff mann, ‘Th e Commission’s European 
Agenda for the Collaborative Economy – (Too) Platform and Service Provider Friendly?’ (2016) 
EuCML 235, 240. 
7 Ibidem. 
8 Th e adjustment of the law on package travel to the digital era is, however, clearly one of the 
main objectives of the new Package Travel Directive – see: Stefanie Bergmann, ‘Die EU-Richtlinie 
über Pauschalreisen und verbundene Reiseleistungen – eine lange Reise zum neuen Recht’ (2016) 
VuR 43, 44. 
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which also exists in the world of the platform economy, i.e. the attribution of the 
contractual relationship to the trader.9 Th e Package Travel Directive attributes 
the contractual relationship to the organiser of the package travel (as defi ned 
in Article 3 section 8), irrespective of the content of declarations by the parties, 
as long as the requirements for the package are fulfi lled (as defi ned in Article 3 
section 2). Th is creates a diff erent perspective on the concept of contract and the
sources of obligations. Th e Package Travel Directive, however, also addresses 
the question of the intermediaries and their liability for the organiser’s failure 
to perform its obligations properly. Th is category of intermediaries is called, 
in the language of the directive, a ‘retailer’ (Article 3 section 9). Th e Package 
Travel Directive allows the Member States to broaden the scope of the organ-
iser’s liability and to apply it respectively to the liability of the retailer (Article 13 
section 1, second sentence). Th is means that it is possible for the Member State 
to extend the scope of the liability also to retailers, and the requirement of full 
harmonisation (Article 4) will be not infringed.10 In Article 20, the Package 
Travel Directive provides for the liability of the retailer for an organiser situated 
outside of the European Economic Area, unless the retailer provides evidence that 
the organiser complies with the specifi ed provisions of the directive. It is a rule 
that prevents the directive’s liability regime from being circumvented.11 Finally,
the Package Travel Directive regulates an ‘intermediary clause’ – Article 23 of the
directive stipulates that a trader cannot be discharged from the liability arising 
under the directive solely by labelling itself as intermediary. 
Th e question of the liability of the intermediary has also been addressed 
in the Wathelet case decided by the CJEU.12 Th e CJEU proposed the criteria 
to apply the rules on the seller’s liability in the sense of the Consumer Sales 
Directive to intermediaries.13 Th ey are, however, mostly connected with the 
requirement of the transparency or the lack of transparency of the intermedi-
ary.14 Th e problem of transparency is also addressed by Article 16 section 1 of 
the Discussion Draft . An intermediary who presents itself in an insuffi  ciently 
‘prominent’ way does not benefi t from the general privilege of non-liability. 
A Member State’s law may impose such liability on the platform operator, 
treating it as a part of the supplier-customer contract. 
9 Klaus Tonner, ‘Die neue Pauschalreisenrichtlinie’ (2016) EuZW 95. 
10 Stefanie Bergmann, ‘Die EU-Richtlinie über Pauschalreisen und verbundene Reiseleistungen – 
eine lange Reise zum neuen Recht’, (2016) VuR 43, 50. 
11 Ibidem, 44. 
12 Cf. Art. 11 Commentary, 5.3.1.Platform becomes liable under the supplier customer contract; 
Art. 18 Commentary, 2. Sources; Art. 22 Commentary, 4. Relation to other provisions in the Discussion 
Draft .
13 Th omas Pfeiff er, ‘EuGH: Agenturmodell im Gebrauchtwagenhandel und Verbrauchs-
güterkaufrichtlinie‘ LMK 2016, 384085; Cf. Art. 18 Commentary, 3. Explanation.
14 Th omas Pfeiff er, ‘EuGH: Agenturmodell im Gebrauchtwagenhandel und Verbrauchs-
güterkaufrichtlinie‘ LMK 2016, 384085.
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3. Explanation
3.1 Th e meaning of Article 16 section 1 
Th is provision sets out the requirements allowing the platform operator to be 
exempted from liability for the supplier, in spite of the exceptions provided in 
Chapter V, especially in the core provision of this chapter – Article 18. In its cur-
rent wording, Article 16 section 1 envisages a guarantee for the platform operators 
against the Member States’ law imposing liability on the platform operator for 
the supplier’s non-performance, unless the provisions of Chapter V provide for 
such liability. Th is does not mean, however, that a platform operator which fails 
to present itself as an intermediary in a suffi  ciently transparent way could escape 
liability provided under Chapter V. All of the liability provisions would apply also
to such an operator. A non-transparent platform operator, however, could
also be subject to further rules coming from the Member State’s law, imposing 
additional liability on the platform operator. 
To benefi t from the guarantee of Article 16 section 1, the platform operator 
must present itself as an intermediary in a transparent way. Th is means that 
a reasonable customer cannot be misled about the role of the platform operator 
when assessing the presentation of the website. 
3.2 Th e meaning of Article 16 section 2 
Th is provision simply plays an informative role and provides an overview of 
the legal institutions arising on the basis of the Discussion Draft . 
4. Relation to other provisions in the Discussion Draft
Th e rules provided by Chapter V are self-standing. Th is chapter does not 
currently provide any sanctions for infringements of the platform operator’s 
duties arising under other chapters of the Discussion Draft . It imposes duties 
or links the liability to the role that the platform operator has as an intermedi-
ary (Article 1815), defi nes the requirements of the liability for the misleading 
information posed by the supplier on the facilities of the platform (Article 1716), 
and deals with the liability of the platform for its own misleading statements 
(Articles 1917 and 2018). Chapter V applies only to such platform operators that 
are intermediaries in the sense of Article 2 letter a. In addition, the platform 
15 Cf. Art. 18 Commentary, 1. Main Content and function.
16 Cf. Art. 17 Commentary, 1. Main content and function.
17 Cf. Art. 19 Commentary, 1.1. Th e principle of liability of the platform operator for damage 
caused by misleading statements made by the platform operator.
18 Cf. Art. 20 Commentary, 1. Main content and function.
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operators that fulfi l the criteria set out in Article 18 section 219 are also regarded 
as intermediaries. In this sense, Article 18 section 2 extends the defi nition of 
the intermediary. Th e operator, who dominates the business of the supplier 
in the way as defi ned in Article 18 and presents itself as intermediary (even in 
a non-transparent way), will be consequently treated as an intermediary, falling 
in the scope of application of the Discussion Draft , even if the Member State 
law regards the platform operator as a party to the supplier-customer contract.
Article 16 section 1 may be read as a sanction for infringing Article 11 
section 1,20 which requires that the platform operator informs the customer 
before the conclusion of a supplier-customer contract that the customer will 
be entering into a contract with the supplier and not with the platform opera-
tor. Section 2 sets out a duty of the platform operator to ensure that the sup-
plier informs the customer that it off ers its goods, services or digital content 
as a trader. Th ere is an overlap between Article 16 section 1 and Article 11 
section 1, as Article 16 section 1 adds a requirement to inform customers in 
a ‘prominent way’ about the platform operator’s role as an intermediary. Here, 
Article 16 section 1 must be read in connection with Article 11 section 1, which 
means that the principle of non-liability applies to the platform operator that 
has fulfi lled the duty arising from Article 11 section 1 and has provided the 
information in the ‘prominent way’. Th e infringement of Article 11 section 2 
is not sanctioned by Article 16 section 1.21 
5. Criticism; amendment proposal
Th e general concept behind Article 16 section 1 needs to be discussed. From the
internal market’s perspective, leaving the non-transparent online platform 
partially outside of the harmonisation is a sanction that does not increase 
the customers’ and suppliers’ reliance on the certainty of the platform law. 
Th erefore, the Discussion Draft  should also address the problem of the liability 
of non-transparent platform operators and subject them to the harmonised law. 
Article 16 should then be reformulated in order to become a real overview. 
It should be noted that the heading is currently rather misleading, as Article 16 
section 1 does not have an informative role but rather a normative one. A new 
article should be created to clearly establish the principle of the non-liability 
of a transparent operator and the liability of a non-transparent operator. Th e 
respective rules could look like this:
19 Cf. Art. 18 Commentary, 3. Explanation.
20 Cf. Art. 11 Commentary, 4.5. Sanctions.
21 Cf. Art. 11 Commentary, 5.3. Consequences and Sanctions.
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In addition to any other liability of the platform operator under the platform-
supplier contract or the platform-customer contract, the platform operator 
may be liable:
(a) to customers for a failure to present itself as an intermediary in a promi-
nent way (Article 16 a Section 2); 
(b) to customers for a failure to remove misleading information given by 
suppliers under Article 17;
(c) to customers who can reasonably rely on the predominant infl uence 
of the platform operator over the suppliers according to Article 18;
(d) to customers or suppliers for misleading statements made by the plat-
form operator under Article 19;
(e) to customers or suppliers for guarantees given under Article 20.
Article 16 a: Duty to disclose the role of the platform operator as an 
intermediary
1. A platform operator that presents itself to customers in a prominent 
way as an intermediary is not liable for the non-performance under the 
supplier-customer contracts. 
2. A platform operator that does not present itself to customers in a promi-
nent way as an intermediary is jointly liable with the supplier for the 
non-performance of the supplier-customer contract. 
Reformulating Article 16 in the suggested way would reduce the function of 
Article 16 to that of pure information on the scheme contained in Chapter V. 
One could ask whether this provision is necessary, bearing in mind that the 
entire structure of the Discussion Draft  should be, among other things, consist-
ent. Th erefore, if the idea of having an introductory provision with an overview 
function is correct, then it should also be used in other chapters, or alternatively, 
it should be abandoned altogether. Th is must be a matter for further discussion. 
Th ere are arguments, however, for having the introductory provision even if 
such a structure would not be endorsed in the remaining chapters. Chapter V 
deals with quite a broad array of the various aspects of liability of the platform 
operator in relation to the performance of the supplier and, in special cases, 
also of the customer. Hence, a certain guide to the structure of Chapter V 
might be useful to facilitate the orientation within the text. Th erefore, to secure 
the accessibility of the Discussion Draft , it is recommended to maintain such 
introductory provision with a solely informative function. 
However, reshaping Article 16 and departing from its current version changes 
the normative content of the article. Th e existing version sets out a closed list 
of grounds for liability of the platform operator in the event of a failure by the 
supplier or customer to perform, but does not provide the basis for the own 
liability of a non-transparent platform operator. Th is means that the Member 
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States are entitled to provide additional liability rules for this category of 
platform operator. Th is system would, however, be too complicated to use in 
practice, and customers (as well as suppliers) would never have certainty in 
relation to content of the rules concerning the liability of the platform opera-
tors. Th e transparency requirement is very vague, since it cannot be precisely 
established whether a certain practice meets this requirement. Th erefore, it is 
not a very reliable requirement for determining the limits of harmonisation. 
Hence it would be easier to harmonise the liability also in the case of a non-
transparent platform operator.
Th e suggested Article 16a would harmonise rules on the liability of the 
non-transparent platform operator. Th e fi rst section of the proposed article 
expresses the principle that the transparent platform operator is not liable 
for the non-performance of the supplier. Th is provision would not, however, 
prevent the possibility of a contractual extension of the platform operator’s 
liability by agreement with the customer. However, the full harmonisation 
principle would prevent extending the platform operator’s liability via extensive 
interpretation the contract in accordance with the Member States’ law. Such 
liability should not be imposed through various ways of completing the con-
tract by the means of the ‘fi ctitious’ interpretation (completing interpretation: 
ergänzende Willensauslegung)22 or implied terms.23 
As opposed to the current version of Article 16 section 1, the proposed 
Article 16a section 1 has been slightly reformulated. In the original version, the 
requirement of transparency in relation to the role of the platform operator as 
an intermediary protects also suppliers. Th ere are, however, no convincing argu-
ments why the lack of transparency of the platform operator in relation to the
supplier should open the path for the platform operator’s liability against
the customer. Article 13 letter a already governs this requirement. Hence, the 
suggested Article 16a section 1 governs exclusively the relationship between 
the platform operator and the customer. 
Article 16a section 2 provides a harmonised basis for the platform
operator’s liability for the non-performance of a supplier in a situation where 
a platform was not identifi ed in a transparent way as an intermediary. It is 
envisaged as a fully harmonised provision, so the Member States would not 
be allowed to adopt rules providing more severe liability of the platform 
operator for the non-performance of suppliers. Using full harmonisation 
provides an advantage in terms of strengthening the internal market, but 
at the same time it is a source of diffi  culty when it comes to determining
the scope of the required harmonisation, and it imposes strict limitations on 
22 On the “completing interpretation“ (ergänzende Willensauslegung) in the German law see e.g.: 
Heinrich Dörner, in Reiner Schulze (ed.), Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Baden-Baden 2016) § 157 No 4. 
23 On the notion of the implied terms in the Common Law see: Richard Austen-Baker, Implied 
Terms in English Contract Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 37. 
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the national law-makers. Th e provision provides that the platform operator is 
liable for the non-performance of the supplier, and that this liability is borne 
jointly with the supplier. Th e proposed solution, in line with the remaining 
provisions of this chapter, does not, however, determine the requirements 
of the liability and their specifi cs. Th e question may be raised as to whether, 
if the proposed provision would be adopted, the Discussion Draft  should 
establish all the requirements for the liability, or whether specifying these 
requirements should be left  to the Member States. Th e proposed provision 
makes the requirements of the platform operator dependent on the require-
ments for the liability of the supplier. In this sense, the requirements for the 
liability are complete – they duplicate the requirements for the liability of 
the supplier. Th e non-transparent operator is liable, if the conditions for the 
liability of the supplier are met. No further requirements for the liability of 
the operator (apart from the requirement of the lack of transparency) are 
set or could be set by the Member State. Th e prerequisites of the supplier’s 
liability would be governed, however, by the applicable law. 
Th is liability scheme assumes that, while the liability of the platform opera-
tor is dependent on the liability of the supplier, it is not a subsidiary liability. 
Th e customer is entitled to remedy the non-performance directly from the 
platform operator, irrespective of whether the customer has ineff ectively tried 
to remedy the non-performance from the supplier. Th e customer has a right to 
exercise all the remedies available against the supplier in relation to the plat-
form operator. It means that Article 16a section 2 provides the customer with 
a possibility to exercise also those remedies against the platform operator that 
modify the legal relationship between the customer and the supplier, such as 
terminating the contract or demanding a price reduction. Hence, the customer 
can exercise these remedies against the platform operator with a direct eff ect 
on the relationship between the supplier and the customer. 
It also means that the platform operator could be an addressee of notices 
on the termination or a price reduction with a direct eff ect on the customer-
-supplier contract. Th e linkage between the supplier-customer contract and 
the operator-customer contract is very close, and Article 16a section 2 builds 
on this foundation. Any notices on termination and price reduction ad-
dressed directly to the supplier would produce also a direct eff ect in relation to
the platform operator. Th e platform operator will then be jointly liable for the 
reimbursement of the price or its surplus. It is still worth discussing whether 
there is a need to provide more detailed rules concerning the content and 
the requirements of the platform operator’s liability. In particular it must be 
discussed whether, in the case of a non-professional supplier, the platform 
operator should be liable as a professional, or like it is at the moment, where 
the content of his liability would be identical to that of the supplier’s liability. 
Such an article could be formulated in the following way:
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Article 16 b: Remedies against the platform operator
1. If the platform operator is liable for the non-performance of the supplier 
in accordance with Article 16a or Article 18, the customer is entitled to 
any remedy against the supplier provided by the law applicable to the 
supplier-customer contract.
2. If, according to the applicable law, in order to exercise a remedy, a cus-
tomer needs to notify the supplier, then notifying the platform operator 
produces all eff ects also in relation to the supplier, and notifying the 
supplier produces all eff ects in relation to the platform operator. 
3. If the platform operator has received notifi cation from the customer 
that might have an impact on the liability of the supplier, the platform 
operator must inform the supplier about it. Th is rule applies respectively 
if the supplier has received such a notifi cation.
4. Th e platform operator may raise all defences that the supplier may have 
against the customer, unless the non-performance is mostly attributable 
to the acts or omissions of the platform operator itself. 
Th e adoption of this article would help to clarify the scheme behind the 
platform operator’s liability: the customer would have the same set of remedies 
against the platform operator as the customer would have under the applicable 
law against the supplier under the supplier-customer contract. Technically, a dif-
ferent law could be applicable to the relations between the platform operator 
and the customers. However, Article 16b provides the same set of remedies in 
the customer-platform operator relation as in the customer-supplier relation. 
It means that the applicable law for the customer-operator relation must du-
plicate the solutions of the law applicable to the customer-supplier contract. 
Article 16b section 1 does not repeat the content of Article 7 section 2. 
Article 7 section 2 deals with the notifi cation addressed to the supplier sent 
using the platform’s facilities,24 while Article 16b section 1 deals with a notifi ca-
tion addressed to the platform operator that also produces eff ects towards the 
supplier and vice versa. Article 16b section 1 does not deal with the attribution 
of a notifi cation to the supplier but with the extended eff ects of the notice. 
Article 16b section 3 imposes a duty to report the received notifi cation. Th is 
duty diff ers from the duty arising on the basis of Article 7 section 1, which 
governs a duty of the platform operator to forward any communication without 
undue delay. Th is duty does not concern, however, notifi cations addressed to 
the platform operator/or to the supplier with a direct eff ect for the other party. 
Th erefore, Article 16b section 2 is necessary. 
Article 16b section 4 clarifi es the relationship between the obligation of 
the supplier and the liability of the operator. Th e obligation of the operator 
24 Cf. Christoph Busch, Hans Schulte-Nölke, Aneta Wiewiórowska-Domagalska and Fryderyk 
Zoll, ‘Th e Rise of the Platform Economy: A New Challenge for the Consumer Contract Law’ (2016) 
EuCML 3, 6–7; Art. 7 Commentary, 1. Main content and function.
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arising from Articles 16a section 2 (as suggested here) and Article 18 should 
then be regarded as dependent (accessory). Th e operator will be entitled to 
raise all exceptions that the supplier would be entitled to raise, such as set off  
or time limits. In certain situations, the liability of the operator should become 
autonomous – if the non-performance of the supplier is caused by the behav-
iour of the operator itself (who, for example, has failed to transmit an order to
the supplier). In such cases, it would be inappropriate to allow the operator
to hide behind the defences of the supplier. 
Th e new composition of Article 16 and the introduction of Article 16a 
were discussed at the meeting of the Research Group in Osnabrück in March 
2017, but no fi nal decision was made. Th e proposed Article 16b has not yet 
been discussed at all.
